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IN THE SUPRHIE COL: RT OF TllF STA TE OF l'T,\H 
SYNERGETICS, A Utah Limited 
Partnership, by and through 
its general partner, LANCER 
INDUSTRIES, INC. , a 
corporation; and ADDLAND 
ENTERPRISES, INC. , 
) 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. 
MARATHON RANCHING CO., 
LTD., and HANS W. ROECK, 
Defendants-Appellants, 
) 
Case No. 19143 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for money damages and for rescission of 
an agreement providing for the exchange of certain real properc 
purportedly owned by defendant Marathon Ranching Col, Ltd., 
located in the Province of Saskatchewan, Canada, for an ocean-
going sailboat owned by plaintiffs alleging that the transaccior. 
was the product of defendants' fraud, misrepresentations and 
deceit. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COCRT 
After the distric court denied defendants' tc dis-
miss for lack of personal jurisdiction, and defendants 
repeatedly refused to comply with disccverv defJult 
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failed to produce documents as ordered and when Roeck repeatedly 
failed to appear for the taking of his deposition pursuant to 
repeated orders of the court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek affirmance of the judgment of the lower 
court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Facts Re Exchange Transaction: 
The statement of facts submitted by counsel for defendants 
is imcomplete and in some instances inaccurate; accordingly the 
following is submitted as a statement of facts: 
l. In May, 1980, plaintiffs exchanged an ocean-going 
sail boat with a value of approximately $352,000.00 for an 
agreement from Harathon Ranching Co., Ltd. ("MARATHON"), a 
Canadian corporation.of which Hans W. Roeck ("ROECK") was 
president for alleged clear title to a quarter section of land 
(160 acres - Rl6, 34) in Canada and the agreement of Marathon 
to assume and pay an obligation of about $200,000.00 owed to 
General Electric Credit Corporation ("GECC") which was secured 
by the boat. (R. 2-4, 16, 17-20, 30-39, 231-249 and 272-277). 
7 Defendants took possession of the boat, failed to make 
any payments whatever thereon (which resulted in plaintiffs 
being required to make payments of $2,419.12 per month on the 
GECC loan). failed to keep the boat insured as required by the 
GCCC loan. concealed the whereabouts of the boat, removed it to 
L1r.iti .md from there to some unknown place. (R. 2-4, 17-20, 30-39, 
anJ 
2 
3. The $7,500.00 check issued 1 dcfcnddnts 3S part pa;-
ment was dishonored by the bank and wds never p3id (R. 3, 246) 
4. Plaintiffs claim th3t the Canadi3n land was not as 
represented and that their to accept that land in 
exchange for the boat was the result of fraud and deceit 
practiced by the defendants upon the plaintiffs. Among the 
misrepresentations and omissions bv defendants are the follow-
ing: (a) the land was represented by defendants to be readily 
marketable and to have a fair market value of $320,000 (R. 35), 
however its maximum market value (had title been clear) did not 
exceed $18,000.00 (&. 275); (b) the land was located 120 miles 
in the bush country; (c) it was represented to be treed and to 
have meadows sloping to a ''shallow gradual declining, safe. 
sandy beach'' adjoining a lake (R. 131), whereas in fact it 
has a high, steep bank which separates the balance of the land 
from the beach. Much of the land is swampy and the adjoining 
lake water is filled with reeds. It is extremely doubtful that 
subdivision of the land W<>ould be permitted under local law, 
and if it were permitted a substantial portion of the land 
would be required to be donated for public benefit under local 
law (most likely the beach area) It is highly urlikely that 
realtors would be interested in showing the land because of the 
long distances involved, poor roads, and because other land 
in the area was available for fraction of the proposed 
cost of this land. Title to the land was not marketable for 
various reasons including claims by to 
whom the defendant had sold the same land, a tax sale fc 
unpaid property taxes, execution levied on the property by 
the holder of a judgment against the defendants, outstanding 
mortgages on the property given by the defendants, etc. 
(R. 239-24-, 272-277). 
5. After the exchange occurred and the boat was delivered 
to defendants Reeck came to Utah (about March, 1981) and 
negotiated a substantial modification of the exchange agreement 
(R. 34) to entirely change the quarter section of land being 
received by plaintiffs for a different quarter section; to give 
defendants the right to "deal with these lands in preparation 
for a subdivision and other investors' participation," subject 
only to defendants' agreement to protect the $100,000.00 price 
which plaintiffs were to receive for that land. (R. 34). The 
new agreement was signed by all parties in Utah. Some of the 
misrepresentations relied upon by plaintiffs were made in 
connection with negotiations for the modification agreement in 
Utah, including the representations therein that the land was 
subdividable and that defendants were "in preparation for a 
subdivision." (R. 34, 272-277). 
6. Plaintiffs claim that most of the misrepresentations 
made by defendants in connection with negotiating the original 
contract (R. 16) and the modification agreement (R. 34) were 
also made in long distance telephone calls between agents of 
plaintiffs and Reeck and by letters written by defendants and 
:nailed into Utah. (R. 31-39, 231-249). Counsel for defendants 
incorrectly assert (P. 6 of brief) that Roeck's affidavit in 
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support of defendarts' motion to quash was nut Lountcred bv 
an affidavit from plaintiff T,1 tht: cnrt rary, 3f:::er RcH:::>C\<'" s 
affidavit was filed, plaintiffs filed an amended verified 
complaint setting forth in detail the contacts with the State 
of Utah upon which Plaintiffs' claims of long drm jurisdiction 
was based. (R. 30-33). 
Facts Re Court Proceedings: 
7. Defendants' moved to quash service of summons with 
supporting affidavit and memorandum of authorities, which 
claimed that the entire transaction, the subject matter of the 
lawsuit, was negotiated and executed outside of the State of 
Utah and that there were insufficient minimal contacts with Ctah 
for long arm jurisdiction. Plaintiffs responded bv an amended 
complaint with supporting exhibits and affidavit (R. 30-39) 
spelling out specific contacts and transactions by defendants 
in the State of Utah, including: 
(a) Telephone calls from Reeck, v.·ho was out of 
state, to agents of plaintiffs, who were in Ctah, 
which telephone calls, defendants repeated most or all of 
the misrepresentations alleged in the original complaint 
(R. 31, , S(a) R. 235-249). Some of these calls included 
negotiations for the exchange agreement <R 31, 16) 
(b) Reeck came to Ctah and while there negc:iated. 
drafted and signed the new agreement which substituted 
different land for the land originallv to te 
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conveyed to plaintiffs in exchange for the boat. The 
Ct ah agreement also included an additional written mis-
representation to the effect that the land said to be 
conveyed to plaintiffs could be and was in process of 
being subdivided, which was false. That fraudulent 
misrepresentation is one of the fraud claims asserted 
in the lawsuit. (R. 31, 5(b)). 
(c) Reeck made numerous telephone calls into Utah 
both before and after execution of both agreements 
(R. 31, 'I 5(c)). 
(d) Defendants caused purported title to the Canadian 
land to be mailed into Utah by his Canadian attorney 
(R. 31, 5 (e), R. 37-38) 
(e) Reeck sent a telegram into Utah on June 10, 1981, 
(R. 32, , 5 (e), R. 39) in furtherance of the scheme to 
defraud. 
8. About June 5, 1982, plaintiffs filed a request for 
production of documents, which required plaintiff to respond 
bv Julv 12, 1982, and served notice of the taking of Roeck's 
deposition on Julv 16, 1982. (R. 44-47). 
9. About June 8, 1982, defendants petitioned the Supreme 
Court for an interlocutory appeaL re denial of their motion 
to quash (R. 87). [See Supreme Court case No. 18504 - notice 
of denial of that ?etition was received by counsel about July 
1982 (R. 73, 'I 6))] 
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10. July 15. 1982. defendants •Jl t3inc'd a protecti\•e orJc·r 
excusing Roeck from appearing for his deposition which was 
scheduled for Julv 16. 1982. but ordered that Ro"ck appear at 
the office of counsel for plaintiff and submit to the taking of 
his deposition within five (5) business davs after notice of 
denial of defendants' petition for interlocutory appeal (R. 63. 
90-92). A copy of that order is attached as appendix "A". 
11. July 22. 1982, notice received denying petition for 
interlocutory appeal (R. 73); accordinglv under the order 
Roeck had through July 29. 1982. to appear for his deposition 
12. Julv 28. 1982. defendants moved for a protective 
order seeking to be excused from the Julv 29. 1982. deposition. 
alleging that Roeck was ill with Pancreatitis and back pain. 
was still in Hawaii and unable to travel. asking that the 
orders mentioned in (appendix "A") be vacated. 
The medical statement furnished stated disahilit:1 through 
August 6 . 19 8 2 . ( R. 71- 7 9 . 99-101) . 
13. July 29. 1982. plaintiffs moved (with supporting memu 
of authorities) for sanctions by reason of defendants' failure 
to produce documents and failure of Roeck to appear for his 
deposition as ordered by the Court (R. 96-08. 102-107 and 
108-109). 
16. August 9. 1982. Court orders documents requested 
in notice of June J, 1982, 8 alcove) DCC proouc·ecd 'J:: i\.cgust lt· 
1982. and that Roeck appear for takin;; of '.;is deposition b:; 
Auoest J7. 1982. (P .. 110. 137-138) Co:ci.e,c ":iid ur"'c·rc: 
are attached hereto as appendix "E" 
15. August 18, 1982, defendants "respond" to June 5, 1982, 
request for production of documents by attaching additional 
copies of documents which nad been attached to defendants' 
April 15, 1982, memorandum of authorities (R. 16-17) and copies 
of documents which plaintiffs had attached to their amended 
complaint (R. 34-39), and by stating that the other documents 
which had been requested were not produced because they were 
not in the possession of defendants' counsel. (R. ll8, 2). 
Absolutely no documents that were not already in the file were 
produced by defendants at that time or at any time thereafter. 
(R. 250-251). 
16. August 18, 1982, defendants move to change deposition 
date of Sept. 13, 1982, claiming that Roeck was still in Hawaii, 
was still ill, and that counsel had been unable to contact 
Roeck until August 15, 1982. No affidavit or statement from a 
physician was filed in support of the alleged illness. 
17. August 18, 1982, Roeck deposition noticed for August 27, 
1982, pursuant to court order (see II 14 above). (R. 136). 
18. August 26, 1982, Court orders that Roeck appear for his 
deposition no later than September 3, 1982, and that if he fails 
to do so upon ex-paity application of counsel for plaintiffs the 
answer of defendants will be struck and judgment entered for 
relief requested in complaint. (R. 144, 157-168). Copies of 
said orders are attached hereto as appendix "C". 
19. September 3, 1982, Roeck appeared for his deposition 
with attorney John T. Anderson, Esq. of the firm of Roe and 
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Fowler. After 15 minutes of deposition (15 pages) Roeck became 
angry about the questions being asked and, against the advice of 
his counsel who advised him that if he left his pleadings miglil 
be struck (Roeclc Deposition P. 14-15), terminated the 
by leaving. The questions being asked pertained to plaintiffs' 
claim that Roeck went through a collusive divorce as a part of 
a scheme to convey his assets in fraud of creditors (Roeck 
deposition, P. 3-15, R. 212, , 2). No questions had yet been 
asked concerning the exchange of the boat for the Canadian land 
or the other transactions between the parties. Roeck has never 
appeared to complete his deposition. (R. 250-251). 
Before leaving the deposition Mr. Roeck stated.while still 
under oath, "The boat doesn't exist anymore. It sunk." (Roeck 
Deposition P. 15, L. 9), which statement was untrue. (R. 276, 
10; R. 213, ' 4). Mr. Roeck also stated "I' 11 see you maybe 
some time the next three years." (Roeck deposition P. 15, 
L. 10-11). Copies of pages 14 and 15 of the Roeck deposition 
are attached as appendix "D". 
Thereafter Roeck stated by affidavit that he would attend 
a rescheduled deposition if given an opportunity to do so (R. 206' 
The Court gave Roeck that opportunity but Roeck again failed to 
appear and the defendants failed to produce the required docu-
ments. (see ' 22 below) 
20. September 8, 1982, counsel for plaintiffs mailed to 
counsel for defendants a motion for sanctions for failure of 
defendants to and fer Reeck to 
appear for his deposition, (which appears to have been omitted 
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from the record - copy attached as appendix "E") and on 
October 6, 1982, filed a supplemental motion for sanctions 
(R. 171-175), then by stipulation that motion was continued 
without date (R. 177-179) pending possible settlement (R. 220) 
then both motions were re-noticed for hearing November 18, 1982, 
when no settlement offer was received (R. 218). 
21. October 22, 1982, defendants filed memorandum of 
authorities in opposition to plaintiffs' motion for sanctions 
(R. 183-203) with affidavit of Roeck offering to return to 
Utah to complete his deposition. (R. 204-206) . 
22. November 18, 1982, Court ordered (R. 222-225) that 
defendants produce all documents required by the request for 
production of June 5, 1982, 8 above - R. 44-47) and that 
Roeck appear for his deposition on or before November 29, 1982, 
and that if they failed to do so their answer would be struck 
and judgment entered. Roeck failed to appear for his deposi-
tion and the documents were not produced. (R. 250-251). Copies 
of those orders are attached as appendix "F". 
23. December 1, 1982, notice of withdrawal by Roe & Fowler 
as counsel for defendants, stating that there had been no oral 
communication with Roeck since September 10, 1982, and no 
written communication since October 7, 1982; that defendants 
had failed to pay attorney fees; but offering to remain in the 
case for purposes of a Rule SS(b)(2), URCP, hearing re damages, 
on short notice. (R. 226). 
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24. December 23, nlaintiffs move tu strike answer 
and enter default judgment. ( R 2 S ll - S 1) . 
25. December 29, 1982, Court grants motion to strike 
answer and enter default judgment. Mr Goss of Roe & Fowler 
attended that hearing on behalf of defenJants (R. 252) A cor 
of that order is attached as appendix "G". 
26. January 5, 1983, Mr. Jones, California counsel for 
defendants, filed an unverified objection to the proposed judg-
ment submitted by plaintiffs' counsel (R. 266-271) asserting 
that there had been no hearing re damages and that Reeck had 
received no notice of recent proceedings or orders. 
27. Februarv 14, 1983, Court on its own motion ordered a 
hearing on defendants'objections. (R. 258, 264). Copies of 
the minute entries are attached as appendix 11 1-i". 
28. February 25, 1983, Court holds hearing re objection 
to proposed order; orders that judgment enter upon filing of an 
affidavit re actual and punitive damages. quieted title to 
boat in plaintiffs; denied request for lien on Canadian 
property. Attorneys Joel Dangerfield and Ronald Goss of Roe & 
Fowler appeared at that hearing on behalf of defendants. 
(R. 265). Copv of minute entry attached as appendix "I". 
29. March 2, 1983, affidavit in support of damages mailed 
(R. 272-277). 
30. March 14, 1983, judgment signed bv Court, a copy of 
which is furnished herewith as appendi.x "J" for the cunvcenien.·c 
of the Court. 
31. Although J 1/2 months passed between the time when 
Roeck lase failed co appear for his deposition and co produce 
documents (see 22 above) and the date of entry of the judg-
ment (see , 30 above) the defendants did not offer co produce 
Reeck for the taking of his deposition and did not produce 
the required documents. Reeck had an opportunity co but did 
not appear for the hearing re entry of judgment held February 
25, 1983, (R. 26, Appendix "I" hereto), co explain to the 
Court reasons for his prior nonappearance, which hearing was 
held almost 3 months after the last date by which he should 
have appeared for the caking of his deposition (see , 22 above). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT SUFFICIENT MINIMAL CONTACT 
EXISTED BETWEEN DEFENDANTS AND THE STATE OF UTAH FOR LONG ARM 
JURISDICTION. 
32. Defendants' 16 pages of citations and argument re 
due process requirements for long arm jurisdiction (P. 9 thru 
25) cite only four Utah cases (P. 12, 16, and 18). Decisions 
from other jurisdictions may be helpful but are not controlling 
upon the Utah Courts. Although many of the decisions cited by 
defendants recite correct general legal concepts, since the 
Utah long-arm differes from the long arm statutes of the 
various states chose decisions are of limited assistance in 
applying the Utah Long Arm Statute co the facts in our case. 
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The Utah Long Arm Court decisions onJ statute discussed 
in 33 below and corrections to anJ discussion of 
asserted in defendants' brief are discussed in, 34 through 38 
below. 
33. Utah long arm statute and decisions. The l'tah Long-
Arm Statute 78-27-24, UCA, 1953, reads in part as follows 
"Any person, . who . 
ing acts, submits himself, 
of the courts of this state 
from: 
. does any of the follow-
. to the jurisdiction 
as to any claim arising 
(1) The transaction of anv business within this 
(2) 
(3) 
state; 
The causing of any injury within this state; 
whether tortious or by breach of warranty;" 
(Emphasis added) 
That statute must be read together with 78-27-23(2), l:CA, 1953, 
which reads in part as follows: 
''(2) The words 'transaction of business within this 
state' mean activities of a nonresident person, 
his agents, or representatives in this state 
which affect persons or businesses within the 
State of Utah." (Emphasis added) 
In construing those statutes the Utah Supreme Court has set 
forth the following basic rules and requirements for exercise 
of long-arm jurisdiction 
(a) An activity which would bring a non-resident 
tortfeasor within the Utah long-arm statute must be 
something done by the party himself or by his agent. 
Hanks v. Adm. of Est. of Jensen, 531 P.2d 363 [In our 
case Roeck himself placed long distance calls into l'tah 
and therein engaged in preliminary negotiations for the 
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original and supplemental contracts, purposefully came 
to Ctah and there renegotiated the consideration to be 
received by plaintiffs from the exchange. Reech made 
misrepresentations of fact both in the telephone calls 
and while in Utah renegotiating for the supplemental 
contract]. 
(b) Minor negotiations are insufficient without more. 
Union Ski Co. v. Union Plastics Corp., 548 P.2d 1257. 
[In our case the acts of Reeck in Utah were not "minor," 
and in fact the supplemental agreement which was made 
in Utah substantially altered palintiffs' rights]. 
(c) Making of a small single retail purchase in Utah 
by out of state visitor is insufficient, it being required 
under "fair play and substantial justice" notions that 
there must be some activity of a more substantial and 
purposeful nature. Dahnken, Inc. v. Marshinsky, 580 P.2d 
596. [The Utah activity to Reeck was of a "substantial 
and purposeful nature]. 
(d) Sufficient "minimum contacts" were found to 
exist where a non-resident purposefully contracted with 
a Utah corporation knowing that goods wouid be likely 
to be used in Utah and derived substantial economic 
benetit from the plaintiff. Burt Drilling, Inc. v. 
Portadrill, 608 P.2d 244. [In our case defendants pur-
posefully contracted with plaintiffs in Utah knowing 
that Synergetics was a Utah partnership, and derived 
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substantial economic benefit from plaintiffs] 
(e) The "doing business" concept Jiffers from the 
"minimal contacts" concept in that unJer the former onc'-' 
it is shown that defendant has conducteJ substantial and 
continuous business activity within the forum state, 
defendant is subject to litigation related or unrelated 
to that business, whereas under the "minimal contacts" 
concept, plaintiff's claim must arise out of some contact 
defendant has with the forum state. Roskellev & Co. v. 
Lerco, Inc. (1980) 610 P.2d 1307. See also language 
quoted on page 13 of defendants' brief. [In our case 
it is not claimed that defendants were "doing business" 
in Utah; Long-arm jurisdiction is based upon the "minimal 
contacts" concept since a substantial part of plaintiffs 
claims arose out of Roeck's telephone calls into Utah 
wherein negotiations and misrepresentations occurred with 
respect to both the original and supplemental contracts, 
and from his visit to etah where misrepresentations were 
made which resulted in the supplemental contract being 
executed in Utah. The supplemental agreement substan-
tially changed the consideration being received by plain-
tiffs in the exchange] 
(f) Utah Court had long-arm over non-
resident manufacturer whose goods were solJ through Utah 
sales representatives. although the non-resiJent did not 
Lrc·hT: -. C:a:rnes, 6:1 2 
-·-------
378. The Court stated in part as follows (at 380): 
"Due process mandates consideration of: 
(1) whether the cause of action arises out of 
or has a substantial connection with the acti-
vitv; 
the balancing of the convenience of the 
parties and the interest of the State in assum-
ing jurisdiction; an 
(3) the character of the defendant's activity 
within the State." (emphasis added) 
The Court then went on to state that: 
"the defendant's activities represent a 
purroseful intrusion into the State which is 
suf icient to supply the requisite factual 
nexus between the defendant and the State. 
Secondly, the State's interest in protecting 
the ri hts of its residents who are adversel 
a ected by the interstate activities o non-
resident manufacturers outweighs any incon-
venience the defendant ma¥ experience in 
defending his activities in the State." 
(emphasis added) 
[As indicated above, a substantial part of plaintiffs' 
claims arose out of Roeck's trip to Utah and the resulting 
supplemental agreement there executed. Reeck claims to 
be a resident of Canada but when questions were asked 
at his deposition concerning his place of residence he 
gave evasive answers, first asserting that is place of 
residence was with his brother's family in Canada, 
although he admitted that there is a dispute as to Roeck's 
claim of a share of ownership of the home. (Reeck depo-
sition P. 3-4); that he does not reside with his family in 
California although a current telephone call to that 
address is met with a recorded message in the voice of 
Reeck (Reeck deposition P. 4-13); and that he has another 
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telephone listed :- i.o :' ,J l cl li l !l 
Calgary, Alterta, ranada 1 l 3 - 1 s) 
. c 1 
convenience of the 1t is that it wou:d 
be less inconvenient for Roeck (who is hard to find) to 
come to Ctah, particularly since he travels extensivelv 
and could probably work his trips into other travel 
plans, than to require plaintiffs herein to try to 
locate Roeck as he travels about. As indicated above, 
Roeck made several "Purposeful intrusions" into the state 
of Utah by making negotiation telephone calls into Ctah, 
by sending letters and legal documents into Ctah, and bv 
his purposeful trip to Ctah to negotiate a sutstantial 
change in the contract The character of Roeck's acti-
vity in Ctah is such that he could reasonably anticipate 
required to litigate disputes arising out of that 
contract in the State of Utah Here Roeck found the tine 
and monev to meet ·cith plaintiffs in the State of ltah, 
and as observed in v. Lerco, 610 P 2d 1307 at 
P. 1313 "it does not 3.ppear that it 1-:ould be a hardship 
J.cfend2nt if ':.e :_s r-equired to Jefe:id this l3wsuit 
in this state 
34 Corrections to "facts" stat<:od in C.:c·f,nJ:m'::s' Point l 
.'lpplic;:ition of the actual "facts" to the 
of l;:iw recitoJ Jcfendants shows that the cases cited 
def cnd;:ir.t support the Courts conclusion that long arrr. juris-
ciiction existed ;:ind show that the Court correctly denied defen-
J;:ints' motion to dismiss. See statement of facts on pages 2 
Lhrough 12 above (, 1 througr. 31). As observed above, some of 
the errors by defendants in reciting the "facts" in Point I 
of defendants' brief are as follows 
(a) Defendants incorrectly assert that plaintiffs 
"did not controvert the statement in Roeck's affidavit 
that the May 23, 1980 agreement ("original agreement") was 
negotiated in Canada and California, not l:tah." (P. 11). 
To the contrary, Roeck's affidavit does not state 
that negotiations were not conducted by telephone or in 
Utah (R. 25, t 3). After filing of the Roeck affidavit 
plaintiffs filed Kent's counter affidavit and their 
amended verified complaint (R. 30-33 - copy attached 
hereto as appendix "K") wherein plaintiffs set forth 
specifically defendants' acts in and contacts with the 
State of Utah, which include the following claims: 
(1) That, prior to execution of the original 
agreement, Roeck made telephone calls from out of 
state to officers of plaintiff who were in Utah; 
that in those calls Roeck made "most or all of the 
misrepresentations as alleged in the original com-
plaint," and that said calls were made as a part of 
ol;:in and schere to defraud. (R. 31, 6(a)) 
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(2) After execution of the original agreement 
Roeck came to Utah, engaged in negotiations, drafted 
and signed an agreement ("Supplemental ,\greement") 
(Ex. "I" to amended complaint - R. 34) which sub-
stantially modified the terms of the original contract. 
The supplemental agreement wholly changed the land 
being conveyed by defendants to plaintiffs and changed 
other consideration to be received by plaintiffs in 
exchange for the boat. The amended complaint and Kent 
affidavit also show that the supplemental agreement 
contained additional affirmative written misrepresen-
tation re (A) the purported intent of defendants to 
repurchase the land for $100,000.00, (E) that defen-
dants were preparing for a subdivision of that land 
and (C) that other investors would be participating 
therein. 
(3) The supplemental agreement also materially 
changed the relationship between the parties in that 
it gave defendants almost unlimited power to deal 
with the land exchanged by defendants as they found 
to be "necessary and fit" so long as the right of 
plaintiffs to the Sl00,000.00 (repurchase price) was 
not affected. (R. 34). Said misrepresentations 
form a substantial part of the fraud claims asserted 
in plaintiffs' original and amended complaints. 
(R. 2-4, R. 30-39). 
- l CJ -
35. Defendants' incorrectly assert that the supplemental 
agreement involved only ''incidental negotiations of a modifica-
tion to the May 23, 1983, agreement" (P. 12) and that the 
"purported modification agreement of March 17, 1981, concerning 
which Roeck made his only physical contact within the State of 
Utah, is not an issue in this litigation." (P. 14). As indi-
cated above, the modification agreement which was negotiated, 
drafted and executed in Utah (a) completely changed the consider-
ation to be received by plaintiff for the boat in that an 
entirely different tract of land was substituted for that 
agreed to in the original exchange agreement, and (b) defendants 
were given full power to deal with the land as they saw fit, 
purportedly to assist defendants with their (misrepresented) 
alleged subdivision of that land in anticipation of defendants' 
exercise of their option to repurchase the land for $100,000.00. 
The maximum benefit which plaintiff could have received from 
the land was receipt of that sum from the exercise by defen-
dants of said option to repurchase while in Utah and as a part 
of the supplemental agreement. Defendants reaffirmed their 
prior misrepresentations (both orally and as a part of the 
modification contract) re their purported intent to exercise 
the option, the purported value of the land, its suitability 
for subdividing, their purported "preparations" toward subdivid-
ing the land, the purported participation by "other investors," 
etc. The fraud practiced in Utah in connection with execution 
of the supplemental agreement is a substantial part of 
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plaintiff's claims. A copv of that scpplcmental a;reement is 
attached as an exhibit to the amended complaint (R. 34 and as 
Appendix "K" hereto). (c) Letters were sent into Vtah by 
Roeck directing defendants' Canadian attorney to forward the 
"Caveat" concerning the Canadian property described in the 
original contract to plaintiffs. (R. 37-38 - copy of attached 
as Appendix "K" hereto). 
36. Point I of defendants brief seems to be almost 
entirely based upon their erroneous conclusion that the sup-
plemental agreement (March 17, 1981) "is not at issue in this 
litigation," (P. 14 & 15). To the contrary, the allegations 
of the amended complaint rely upon the supplemental agreement 
(R. 31, • 6(b)) and a copy of said supplemental agreement is 
attached hereto as Appendix "K". With that corrected fact in 
mind, the cases cited in defendants' memorandum support the 
lower Court's decision, finding sufficient "minimal contact" to 
justify exercise of long-arm jurisdiction, particularly ·.,·here. 
as here, the cause of action arose out of that very contact in 
Utah (making of the supplemental agreement). 
37. Counsel for defendants also incorrectly states (P 14) 
that the telephone calls made by defendants into Ctah "did not 
involve negotiations for the sale and purchase of the subject 
sailboat, citing Roeck's affidavit, R. 25, however that affidavit 
makes no statements as to the content of said telephone calls. 
On the other hand Kent's affidavit shows that in fact "most er 
all of the misrepresentations alleged in the comolaint 
"l 
were made by Roeck during said telephone conversations, 
R. 31, 6 (a). Defendants' argument that mail and telephone 
calls are "insufficient activity within the forum state to 
allow jurisdiction: (P. 17) relies upon situations where the 
letters and telephone calls were only "secondary or ancillary 
factors," and are factually different from the true facts in 
this case. Where, as here, the fraud occurred in part in con-
nection as a part of the telephone calls made by defendants into 
Utah and mail sent by defendants into Utah, it is not "secondary 
or ancillary" and is sufficient, standing alone, to justify 
long-arm jurisdiction. 
38. Defendants conclude their Point I by stating that 
it would be "repugnant to the fundamental fairness principal 
of International Shoe" v. \lashing ton, 326 US 310, 66 S Ct 154, 
90 LEd 95 (1945) to "require defendants to answer in Utah for 
their participation in a transaction executed in the province 
of Saskatchewan, the object of which was the exchange of Canadian 
property for an ocean-going sailboat docked in California." If 
the facts were as stated by defendants we would agree with that 
argument. Defendants, however, omit to include in their fact 
summary that (a) the original transaction was negotiated in part 
bv telephone calls made by defendants into Utah in which sub-
stantial misrepresentations of fact were made which led to the 
nriginal contract, (b) that a supplemental contract was made 
in Utah which substituted a different parcel of land to be 
received by plaintiffs in the exchange, gave defendants an 
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option to repurchase that land for Sc''''. '"J'' 111. ;;a'-'c• dE: ft'ndJnts 
a power of attorney to deal 1-:i th t 1c3t land 3S the:1 "sa.,,· fit." ,. 
(c) that while in Utah defendants r.oad<e both oral and i,Titten 
misrepresentations of fact as to the value of the land, as to 
its subdividability, investments by others in the project, stat115 
of the subdivision project, etc. With the full facts and cir-
cumstances in mind the arguments advanced by defendants support 
exercise of long-arm jurisdiction by the Court. 
39. Threshold jurisdiction established. At the stage to 
which the case had progressed, it was enough for plaintiffs to 
show "threshold jurisdiction: sufficient to "demonstrate the 
fairness of allowing them to continue suit here." Roskellev v. 
Lecero, 610 P.2d 1307 at P. 1310, quoting with approval from 
U.S. v. Montreal Co., 358 F.2d 239 at pages 242-243 The Court 
then held that the procedures from Rule 56(e), CRCP. re affi-
davits in motions for summary judgment was an appropriate 
procedure in determing jurisdiction prior to trial. The veri-
fied pleadings and Kent's Affidavit clearl:1 meet this "t!-'.reshoccl 
jurisdiction: requirement and justified the Court in finding 
that it had long-arm jurisdiction over defendants. 
40. US Supreme Ct. holds that sanction of finding facts to 
be established sucporting long-arm jurisdictior. coes not vio2.ate 
due process. In a fact situation much like our"s. the L'.'." 
Supreme Court recently affirmed an order of 3 l·.:·uer Fedt:r3l 
Court which ir:lposed as a sancti.on undE:r- !'.ule 37(\c) (:') fP.CP 
[i:.\·hich is p:-actic3.ll:1 iC.er.tical to f'.=) l'?,CP] .J 
determination that facts necessary to support a finding of per-
sonal jurisdiction In that case the non-resident 
defendants had (as in our case) repeatedly failed to comply with 
Jiscovery and court orders compelling discovery. Insurance Corp. 
of Ireland, Ltd. et al., v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 
102 S. Ct. 2099 (June, 1982). The U. S. Supreme Court stated in 
part at P. 2106 as follows: 
"By submitting to the jurisdiction of the court for 
the limited ur ose of challen in ·urisdiction, the 
de endant agrees to abi e by that court s determina-
tion on the issue of jurisdiction; That decision 
will be res judicata on that issue in any further 
proceedings." (emphasis added) 
At P. 2108 the Court stated in part as tolLows: 
"Petitioners failure to supply the requested infor-
mation as to its contacts with Pennsylvania supports 
'i:l1epresumption that the refusal to produce evidence 
. . was but an admission of the want of merit in 
the asserted defense.' (citations omitted) The 
sanction took as established the facts - contacts 
with Pennsylvania - that CBG was seeking to establish 
through discovery. That a particular legal conse-
quence - personal jurisdiction of the court over the 
defendants - follows from this, does not in any way 
affect the appropriateness of the sanction." (empha-
sis added) 
In a like manner defendants in our case should be precluded 
from contesting the finding of the Court that sufficient 
minimal contacts existed to establish jurisdiction by reason 
of their failure to comply with discovery orders. 
41 Conclusion. The trial Court properly concluded 
that defendants h::id made sufficient purposeful "minimal con-
rcJcts" h'ith the State of Utah to permit the Utah Courts under 
notions of justice and fair play to require the 
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defendants to defend this lawsuit in which lawsuit 
resulted in substantial part from those purposeful activities 
by defendants in Utah. Accordint;l:1. the decision of the lm-er 
Court re existence long-arm jurisdiction should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ASSESSED DAMAGES AFTER HEARING. 
42. Counsel for defendants incorrectly argue that no 
hearing was held before assessment of damages. The Court held 
such a hearing and gave defendants full opportunity to appear, 
present evidence, and to make appropriate objections. 
43. The facts surrounding the entrv of judgment are set 
forth in 23 through 30 above, which shows t11at: 
(a) Counsel for defendants attenced the hearing 
which resulted in imposing sanction of striking of answer 
and entry of defendants' default for failure to comply 
with discovery orders 25 above - copy of order attached 
as Appendix "G") . 
(b) Counsel for defendants objected to entry of 
judgment without a hearing to assess damat;es 26 above 
R. 266-271). 
(c) The Court on its own motion scheduled a hearing 
re those objections. (, 27 above - R 258, 264 - Appendix 
"H" hereto). 
(d) Court hearing was held Cil 28 above - •'.ppend1x "I" 
hereto) at which defendants were represented bv counsel 
At that hearing some of the relief sought bv plaintiffs 
1' - -
(lein on Canadian land) was denied and the Court ordered 
plaintiffs to file an affidavit in support of their claims 
for damages Counsel for defendants had full opportunity 
to object to Court's procedure, but failed to do and 
cannot now raise that issue for the first time on appeal. 
(e) The required affidavit re damages was filed (See 
29 above). Thereafter, the Court entered its judgment, 
a copy of which is furnished herewith as Appendix "J". 
It is important to note that the judgment expressly pro-
vides that upon prompt return of the boat in good condi-
tion the $352,000.00 of damages for conversion would be 
deemed satisfied, and that the Court would determine the 
amount of credit to be allowed if the boat was returned 
under different circumstances (see 2 of judgment). The 
judgment for $100,000.00 rental value during the period 
while the boat was detained is based upon plaintiffs' 
affidavit and punitive damages are assessed based upon 
fraud and misrepresentation as detailed in that affidavit. 
The boat has not been and probably never will be returned. 
The judgment was and is justitied under the circumstances. 
(f) No counter-affidavit was filed by defendants; no 
objections were made by defendants to the affidavit or its 
sufficiency; and no objections were made by defendants 
to the terms of the judgment itself. Issues re the suf-
ficiencv of the Court's procedures are raised for the 
first time on appeal. 
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44. Hearing was held. From the foregoing it is apparent 
that defendants were well represente<l at all stages of the 
proceedings; that a hearing was in fact held at which counsel 
for defendants were given an opportunity to present evidence, 
to object, etc.; that a detailed affidavit was filed by plain-
tiffs in support of their claim for damages, rental value and 
punitive damages, which affidavit included a detailed recital 
of the various acts of fraud and deceit practiced by defendants 
upon plaintiff, (R. 272-277). The Court was fully justified 
in entering said judgment based upon the record in this matter 
and that affidavit. That affidavit was requested by the Court 
pursuant to Rule 55(b)(2), which reads in part as follows 
"If, in order to enable the court to enter judgment 
- it is necessary to . . determine the amount 
of damages or to establish the truth of any averment 
by evidence or to make any investigation of any 
other matter, the court may conduct such hearings or 
order such references as it deems necessary and 
proper." (emphasis added). 
Whether or not such a hearing is held is discretionary with 
the Court since the rule uses the word The Court, how-
ever, ordered such a hearing and requested plaintiffs' file a 
supporting affidavit. Defendants failed to object to the 
sufficiency of the affidavit and thereby waived any objection 
that they might have raised with respect to the content of 
the affidavit. See Fox v. Allstate Ins. Co. 22 c (2d) 383' 
453 P.2d 701; Strange v. Ostlund (1979) 594 P 2d 877. Having 
failed to object to the affidavit, 
c-- · 
given the District Judge the opportunity to correct any possi-
ble error, defendants cannot now raise that question for the 
first time on appeal. 
45. Cannot raise issue for first time on appeal. Rule 46, 
URCP, eliminates the need for formal exceptions to the Court's 
rulings, but does not eliminate the requirement that some objec-
tion be made to the trial Court if the question is to be pre-
served for appeal. That rule reads in part as follows: 
"Formal exceptions to rulings or orders of the court 
are unnecessary. It is sufficient that a party, at 
the time the ruling or order of the Court is made or 
sought, makes known to the court the action which he 
desires the court to take or his objection to the 
action of the court and his grounds therefor; 
(emphasis added) 
Counsel for defendants wholly failed to "make known to the court 
the action which he desired the court to take" with respect 
to plaintiffs' affidavit or the content of the judgment itself, or 
their objections (if any) thereto, as required by that rule. 
Having failed to do so they cannot now raise those objections 
for the first time on appeal. Nelson v. Blomquist, 378 P. 2d 891, 
14 U.2d 133; Corner v. Inc., 387 P. 2d 85; Stagmeyer v. 
Leatham Bros., Inc., 439 P.2d 279, 20 U.2d 421. Failure to move 
for a new trial precludes defendants from raising on appeal the 
sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the judgment. Brighan v. 
Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n., 470 P.2d 393, 24 U.2d 292 
46. Appeals limited to law questions. The foregoing rules 
are not mere technicalities, but are founded upon constitutional 
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limitations on the power of the Suprcrc Court Art VIII. § o 
of the Utah Constitution reads in part as rollows 
"From all final judgr.icents c'f the distric courts. 
there shall be a right of appeal to the Supreme 
Court. The appeal shall be upon the record made 
in the court below In equitv cases the 
appeal may be on questions of both law and fact, 
in cases at law the appeal shall be on questions 
of law alone." 
Unless a party calls the question from which an appeal is taken 
to the attention of the Court and obtains a ruling thereon from 
the Court from which ruling an appeal can be taken, there is 
no question of law involved. It is onlv from an incorrect 
of law by the trial court that an appeal to the Gtah Supreme 
Court will lie. such a ruling all that exists is a 
question of fact which is not reviewatle bv the Supreme Court 
That rule is also founded upon the sound principal that a par:·· 
should not be permitted to lead the Court into error t·; failing 
to call a matter to the attention of the trial court so that 
appropriate correction could be made without the necessitv of 
an appeal. 
47. The Securitv Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. lie st, c· 
292, 437 P. 2nd 214 11968) mentioned on pagE of defendants' 
brief was a situation involving reversal of an order of the 
District Court refusing to vacate a default judgr.ient the 
trial court had no evidence in support of its nf 
damages in its default judgment 
tinguishable in that (as indicated on P ,i ',11', c) 1 ::c ·1:-1 t:..; ·.\J::-
held, a detailed 2.'.°Ld.:r:it ·.:as fi :cc.'. :·l 
;r1cticed bv defendants and the darrages sustained by plaintiffs 
i:,d ·,-,ao a'1ail.:ible to the Court in determining the amounts to 
.:is a ?art of the judgment. Defendants in our case 
had a full opportunity to object to the affidavit, to present 
addition.:il evidence, etc. to the Court prior to or following 
entry of judgment. 
48. Conclusion. The judgment as framed by the Court was 
fair and just under the circumstances, particularly where, as 
here, it was awarded as a sanction for repeated failure to 
comply with discovery and repeated disobedience of court orders. 
POINT III 
THE COURT \.;As JCSTIFIED IN STRIKrnG DFFF.NDANTS' AtlS\..'ER AND 
E'.'1TERING DEFACLT JCDGNENT IN VIEW OF DEFENDANTS' REPEATED DIS-
OF DISCOVERY ORDERS 
49 Su=ar1 of disobe.,ed court orders. For the conveni-
ence of the Court, and to assist in more fully understanding 
the frustration experienced by plaintiffs and the Court from 
defendants willful and repeated disregard of discovery and 
orders corr:pelling discoverv, we have set forth 7 through 
31 a surr.mary of the court proceedings which led to the Court 
striking defendants' answer and entering of the default 
jud[rnent, and have attached hereto as an appendix, copies of 
VAYious minute entries and Court orders which defendants dis-
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Appendix "A" - 7-15-82 - orders production of docuDE'nts 
and appearance by Roe ck for deposition ·.;i thin S da?s 
after denial by Supreme Court of defendants' petition 
for interlocutory appeal. 
Appendix "B" - 8-19-82 - order requiring production of 
documents by 8-16-82 and that Roed: appear for deposi-
tion no later than 8-27-82. 
Appendix "C" - 8-26-82 - orders that Roed: appear for 
deposition no later than 9-3-82 and that, upon failure 
to do so upon ex-party application, defendants' answer 
will be struck and default judgment entered for relief 
requested. 
Appendix "D" - 9-3-82 - partial copy of Roeck deposition 
where Roeck refused to answer questions and wal\·ed 
out of deposition after 15 minutes of questions 
Appendix "F" - 11-18-82 - orders that Roeck appear for 
his deposition and produce documents within 10 days 
and that Roeck not leave deposition until excused by 
counsel for plaintiffs; that upon failure to comply 
the court will feel compelled to strike answer and 
enter default. 
Aptendix "G" - 12-29-82 - orders answer struck and de-
ault judgment be granted. 
50. Failure of defendants to corrununicate with their la,,-;er 
is inexcusable. From the foregoing it is clear that the Court 
was most tolerant of defendants' excuses and that the Court 
repeatedly gave defendants additional chances to cornpl;1 but 
that defendants wilfully failed to do so. The only point raised 
on appeal by defendants is that Roeck allegedly had no notice 
of the orders and accordingly no opportunity to comply, (defen-
dants' brief, pages 27-29). In support of that claim, defendant:' 
brief cites the following unsworn declaration b? Jones, co-
counsel for defendants (R. 256-257) 
"The undersigned further declares that the defendant 
Hans Reeck beer. for __ 
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45 davs, outside the continental United States, and 
has received absolutely no notice or knowledge of 
any of the proceedings or orders leading up to and 
including the apparent order of the above entitled 
Court striking defendants' answer in the above 
entitled matter and for entry of judgment against 
defendants and in favor of plaintiffs." (emphasis 
added) . 
That motion is dated Januray 5, 1983, (R. 256-257), which 
means that Reeck had not been in contact with his counsel since 
about November 21, 1982, (a Sunday), however counsel for defen-
dants motion for permission to withdraw states that Roeck has 
not been in oral cormnunication with his attorneys since Sep-
tember 10, 1982, and has not been in written cormnunication since 
October 7, 1982, (R. 227, 'J 3). That motion for permission to 
withdraw is based upon Roeck's "failure to maintain contact and 
communication with his lawyers throughout this litigation," 
(R. 226, 11 1). Apparently that failure on the part of Roeck 
to cormnu::licate with his lawyers continued through March 14, 1983, 
when the judgment was signed by the Court, since there were no 
further offers by Roeck to appear for the taking of his deposi-
tion and no documents were produced within that time. Apparently 
the October 7, 1982, communication was Roeck's September 21, 
1982, affidavit (R. 204-206) wherein he offered to return to 
Scilt Lake Cit:1 to complete the deposition (R. 206, 5). Notwith-
standing that offer by Roeck to return and submit to deposition, 
he wholly failed during the following six months to contact his 
counsel to determine whether or not his offer to return had 
been accepted. It is difficult to believe that said offer was 
::iade in good faith \·:hen he thereafter completely ignoreo his 
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attorneys and the pendir.g_ .,·r11cccl::..:· 
of a client to Keep in cont.Jct '.1•_' · 11'.-, .1t'1 rr:cl is 1 ( 
ments based upon lack of actual notice to c!1ent (Defendant• 
brief page 27) when lack of notice resulted solelv from Roeck's 
willful failure to communicate uith his attorcie:;s 
51. Counsel for defendants finally argues (P 29) that 
"defendants' failure to comply the court's discovery 
order is excusable," without offering any reasonable excuse 
other than that Roeck simplv chose to ignore the Court's orders. 
failed to keep in contact with his attorneys for approximatelv 
6 months (or more), and ignored his obligations in this lawsuit 
It is doubtful, in view of the conduct of Roeck, that the docu-
ments would have been produced or the deposition would have 
been taken had the Court given defendants another 6 months 
Either the discovery rules mean something or they don't. If 
every lawsuit were met with this type of misconduct the Courts 
would be clogged and justice would be denied Repeated refusal 
to obey court orders cannot be tolerated. To tolerate such mis-
conduct would wholly destrov our svstem of law and order which 
is based upon compliance with Court orders 
5:'. Prior decisions affir.:iing sar.ctiors for failure to 
perrr.it discovec: T1-:e Uta.h Suprer;;e r-2s 1:.-firmel: 
sanctions b·.' in various 
\0! ln Tucker Realt·1, Inc. v. [;unlev, 16 l'. 2d 97, 
:,10, the l'tah Supreme Court affirr.ed a judgment 
awarded because defendant did not comply with pretrial 
discovery order to produce documents suppotting claim 
of discharge of promissorv note. 
(b) In W. '.-1 & vi. E. Gardner, Inc. •1. Park West 
Villae;e, Inc., (1977) 568 P.2d 734 the l'tah Supreme Court 
affirmed a default judgment where there had been a frus-
Cration of the judicial process, as where (as here) the 
I 
failure to respond to discovery impedes trial on the 
merits and makes it impossible to ascertain whether the 
allegations of the answer have any factual merit. [In 
our situation, the disregard by Roeck of discovery orders 
was far more outrageous than the fact situation in the 
above-quoted case. In that case belated arswers to 
interrogatories were served after the motion and prior 
to the hearing and the Court imposed the sanctions with-
out first making an order coopelling discovery] 
53. Possible remittitur. Should the Court determine that 
the punitive damages award are excessive (we believe that they 
·..;e::-c fully justified under the circumstances) this \;ould be 
Jn case for the Court to order a remittitur as to 
1 ["LHt of the punitive damages and to affirm the balance of the 
See Ctah State Road ComI'.1. v. Johnson, 550 P.2d 216. 
- 34 -
cm:cLUSIOtl 
54. A substantial part of plaintiffs' claim arose out of 
fraud and deceit, practiced by Roe ck in Utah, in conne::tion 
with negotiation and signing of a supplemental contract which 
substantially changed the rights of plaintiff under the exchange 
agreement, which the Court properly found to constitute suffi-
cient "minimal contacts" for the Court to exercise long-arm 
jurisdiction over the defendants. Defendants repeated failure 
to comply with discovery orders justified the Court in finally 
striking the answer and entering/Judgment by default. Defen-
dants' counsel participated in/the hearings, which resulted in 
/ 
the judgment, which judgment'was supported by a detailed affida-
vit re fraud and deceit by defendants and resulting damages to 
plaintiffs. Defendants Maived any objection that they might have 
raised to the of that affidavit by failing to otject 
to the affidavit or/to the judgment itself. Defendants cannot 
contest the sufficiency of said affidavit for the first time on 
appeal. Defend,B.nts have had their opportunity to litigate the 
matter on it¥ merits and have refused to do so. It is unlikel\' 
I 
that defen¢'ants would behave any differently if a new trial "ere 
granted, based upon their prior misconduct as discussed above 
I 
)35. The Court's judgment should be affi rr:ied. 
Dated the 1st day of September, 1983 
, \2( ; '._ . c ' {'.( j /- ( 
"Ronald C. Earker, attorne:; for ;claintff(s 
Svnergetics and Lancer Industries. Inc. 
, I t:_ /: ' I 
RObrt L. Loru\ attorre·; for 
Enterprise:s, Inc. . · 
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(a) In Tucker Realty, Inc. v. Nunley, 16 U2d 97, 396 P.2d 
410, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed a judgment awarded 
because defendant did not comply with pretrial discovery order 
to produce documents supporting claim of discharge of promissory 
nute. 
(b) In W. W. & W. B. Gardner, Inc. v. Park West Village 
Inc. (1977) 568 P.2d 734 the Utah Supreme Court affirmed a 
default judgment where there had been a frustration of the 
judicial process, as where (as here) the failure to respond 
to discovery impedes trial on the merits and makes it impossible 
to ascertain whether the allegations of the answer have any 
factual merit. [In our situation, the disregard by Reeck of 
discovery orders was far more outrageous than the fact situation 
in the above-quoted case. In that case belated answers to 
interrogatories were served after the motion and prior to the 
hearing and the Court imposed the sanctions without first making 
an order compelling discovery]. 
(c) In Empire Corp v. Empire Credit, Inc., et al. #16237 
an unreported Utah Supreme Court decision filed January 3, 1980, 
(copy furnished as Appendix "L" hereto) the Utah Supreme Court 
affirmed a similar order in striking the answer and entering 
default judgment for $84,800.0C as a result of a similar repeated 
failure of the defendants to comply with discovery orders. In 
that decision the Court stated at page 3 in part as follows: 
"Thou§'h it is true that the courts should be 
indulgent in setting aside default judgments 
to the end that controversied be resolved on 
their merits, it is also true that there must 
be an end to such patience and indulgence." 
- 1 /1 -
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53. Possihle remittitur. Should the Court determine that 
the punitive damages award are excessive (we believe that they 
wc·n· fully justified under the circumstances) this would be an 
appropriate case for the Court to order a rimittitur as to a 
part of the punitive damages and to affirm the balance of the 
iudgment. See Utah State Road Comm. v. Johnson, 550 P.2d 216. 
CONCLUSION 
54. A substantial part of plaintiffs' claim arose out 
of fraud and deceit, practiced by Roeck in Utah, in connection 
with negotiation and signing of a supplemental cor,tract which 
suhstantially changed the right of plaintiff under the exchange 
agreement, which the Court properly found to constitute suffi-
cient "minimal contacts: for the Court to exercise long-arm 
jurisdiction over the defendants. Defendants repeated failure 
Lo comply with discovery orders justified the Court in finally 
striking the answer and entering judgment by default. Defendants' 
counsel participated in the hearings, which resulted in the 
judgment, which judgment was supported by a detailed affidavit 
re fraud and deceit by defendants and resulting damages to 
plair.tiffs. Defendants waived any objection that they might 
have raised to the sufficiency of that affidavit by failing 
to object to the affidavit or to the judgment itself. Defendants 
cannot contest the sufficiency of said affidavit for the first 
time on appeal. Defendants have had their opportunity to 
litigate the matter or. its merits and have refused to do so. It 
is unlikelv that defendants would behave any differently if a 
new trial were granted, based upon their prior misconduct as 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certifv that I caused 3 copies of the foregoing 
l>rief together with 3 copies of the Appendix, to be mailed, 
postage prepaid, the 1st day of September, 1983, to each of 
the following persons at the addresses indicated: 
W. Montgomery Jones, JONES AND JONES, 1340 Munras Avenue, 
Monterey, California 93940 
William G. Fowler, Bryce E. Roe, Joel R. Dangerfield 
and Ronald W. Goss, ROE AND FOWLER, 340 East Fourth 
South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Ronald C. Barker 
- 36 -
SYNERGETICS, et al. v. MARATHON RANCHING, CO. et al. # 19143 
dicussed above. 
SS. The Court's judgment shoud be affirmed. 
Dated the of November, 1983. 
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